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From Social Cognition to the Cognition of the Social: 









In his doctoral thesis Gerard Duveen discussed extensively the relations between the 
epistemic subject and social life (Duveen, 1983). How is the subject of knowledge at 
one and the same time the subject of society? This was a problem that he pursued 
unrelentingly in his writing, teaching and scholarly conversations and, as I recently 
discovered, can be found at the heart of his early work. In a detailed and highly 
theoretically driven empirical exploration of children’s concepts of friendship Duveen 
demonstrates that in human development the separation between knowledge and 
everyday experience does not obtain. He writes: 
 
“…objects are encountered first of all outside the theoretical structures of 
psychology; they exist primarily as human reality, as aspects of being produced 
and maintained through human action. In this sense they are not concepts 
produced through the operation of psychological theories but rather are created 
within the context of the lived experience of everyday life; they are encountered 
first of all within the life space of individuals (the lebenswelt or what Sartre has 
termed le vecu). Indeed they are so closely interwoven into the texture of this 
context that in thinking about them it is difficult to detach them from this 
totality; they are implicated at every level the conceptual, the affective and the 
practical” (Duveen, 1983, p. 224)  
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Duveen shows that the development of cognition is inseparable from the 
emotional structures of psychological development and the material structures of 
social, economic and cultural worlds: the purely epistemic subject stands as a fiction. 
He understood the inter-relations between these different domains. His contribution 
was focused in demonstrating that as children develop and construct knowledge they 
also grow into competent social actors. Human development is social and 
psychological; take one at the expense of the other and you have only half of the story 
and an incomplete theory. And as the good Piagetian that he was, Gerard knew that 
this development is also articulated with the biological maturation of the child, which 
intersects in complex and absolutely necessary ways with the development and 
consolidation of cognition (Duveen, 1997).  
In a collaboration with Psaltis and Perret-Clermont posthumously published (an 
apt legacy, in a paper written both with a former student and a long standing colleague 
who provided important intellectual references) Gerard Duveen again engages in this 
project. With his co-authors, he re-examines the Piagetian effort of integrating the 
psychological and social domains, assesses the research programme that followed in 
its wake and considers how Piaget and Vygotsky could be fruitfully articulated 
(Psaltis, Duveen, Perret-Clermont, 2009). Developed in this final paper is the idea of 
operativity-in-context, which condenses many years of experimental and ethnographic 
research in Geneva, Sussex and Cambridge on how the construction of the mental is 
not only permeated by social interaction but dependent on it.  As they show, it is only 
in context, never without it or out of it, that the psychological emerges. The paper also 
provides a sobering statement about how misleading the usual portrait of Piaget’s 
developmental theory as asocial is. As Nicolopoulou and Weintraub (2009) point out 
in their pertinent comments on this provoking paper, even a casual inspection of 
Piaget’s essays and books is sufficient to demonstrate that the social was not only a 
preoccupation but also a fundamental component of Piagetian psychology, with the 
essays collected in Sociological Studies (1965/1995) offering the most clear 
formulation.  
So from very early on in his academic writings to the very end of his life 
Duveen sustained a critical engagement with Piagetian psychology based on a dual 
commitment to think with and against Piaget (2000a; 2001b). Duveen never shed the 
inspiration and influence that Piaget exerted on him and never ceased to be critical of 
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Piaget. The problem was not that Piaget was asocial, but how Piaget treated the social 
and how the excessive rationalism of his universal sequence of development 
obfuscated the role of contextual determinants, not to mention the role of context on 
Piaget’s own views. To address this problem Duveen turned to the possibility of 
integrating social and developmental psychology, something that he cherished 
throughout his career and that is fully expressed in his work on development (Duveen 
and Lloyd, 1990; Duveen, 1985, 1988, 1996; Lloyd and Duveen, 1992). As he wrote 
many times, children develop in a world of preceding social representations and deal 
with self-development amidst the tensions and the potentials of existing social 
identities. Both phenomena are part of the contextual matrix of development and need 
to be taken into account if we are to fully understand how a human infant becomes a 
person.  
As an ambivalent Piagetian Duveen found in the social psychology of Serge 
Moscovici, himself an admirer and a critic of Piaget, the concepts that helped him to 
make the jump from social cognition to the cognition of the social. Social 
representations became central for answering the fracture between the epistemic and 
the social psychological subject identified in Piaget. Carefully retaining what was 
important to retain, he went beyond Piaget to show that to know an object involves 
knowing an object that is always-already known and signified by a socio-cultural 
context, made relevant or discarded by a community, invested with values and larger 
social representations that frame what is knowable and thinkable in a given time and 
place. Social influence and social representations, as concepts and as phenomena, 
allowed him to explain the ways in which children come to understand society and in 
this process understand themselves and the object-world. The studies on children’s 
understanding of kinship and friendship, his later and widely recognised contribution 
with Barbara Lloyd on children’s understanding of gender and our more recent project 
on how children in different social and cultural milieus construct public spheres, all 
tried to show that the construction of cognition by individual minds is always and at 
the same time a co-construction with other minds, which collectively, in social 
institutions, in political systems, in historical trajectories, in cultural communities, 
define at given times and contexts the boundaries of what is known.  
His ambivalent relation to Piaget also transpires on the manner he understood 
agency. As a Piagetian, Duveen knew that the agency of the child is crucial, indeed 
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the child must see and believe herself an absolute innovator, a creator and constructor 
of all that is there waiting for her to remake. But in line with his teacher and early 
supervisor, Hans Furth, Duveen problematised this agency by introducing the 
dynamic of desire in the constitution of the epistemic subject. To know-my-object is 
also to want-my-object. This insight probed a long-term commitment to the deep 
psychology of Freud, which was never too far from Duveen’s thinking and way of 
seeing the world. In writing about the development of representation and culture in 
the pretend-play of young children he goes back to the links between knowledge and 
desire to show how the drive that moves the child to create and construct the world as 
innovator is not far from libidinal organisation (Duveen, 2000b).  
We discussed this problem extensively when I was formulating Knowledge in 
Context and it was from his insights on the ontogenesis of knowledge that I developed 
the idea of exploring what a system of knowledge wants to represent. It was awkward 
perhaps to pose this question to knowledge, but he helped to pursue the idea of seeing 
epistemic constructions as ontological constructions, ways of reading and investing 
the world, permanently traversed by the deep psychology of self-other relations. 
Knowledge statements are never too far away from statements about being; our 
epistemic constructions are inseparable from the multitude of voices with which we 
engage as we develop a sense of self and knowledge of the object-world. To know the 
world is to be in the world for the world. This, we concurred, was the radical insight 
of Moscovici (2008), Jodelet (1991) and Marková (2003), in one way or another 
offered by most socio-cultural traditions in psychology: the psychology of cognitive 
development must deal with the fact that cognition is hot from the start and 
knowledge emerges and evolves intertwined with the deep psychology of self-other 
relations.  What a delight and what a privilege it was to engage with such an 
interlocutor, benefit from his vast knowledge and erudition and listen to his examples 
flowing from fiction, music and developmental psychology alike.  
Decentration is yet another concept in which Gerard’s ambivalent engagement 
with Piaget becomes evident. His thesis sub-title was ‘An essay in decentration’. The 
notion of decentration has not found too strong a space in the prevailing impetus of 
modern psychology. While the Vygotskian concept of mediation eventually found a 
firm position in the theoretical landscape of the discipline, decentration, which is not 
too far away from mediation, remained slightly marginal and to some extent unknown. 
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But Gerard knew that decentration is paramount to a societal psychology, indeed to all 
human psychology, for it refers back to what Rob Farr (1996) described as the inner 
core of all major psychological systems of a social kind: the relational and dialogical 
processes that allow the human self to know and understand itself by stepping out of 
itself and moving towards other people in action and cognition. Mead provided the 
classical demonstration of these processes in the genesis of selves and societies; 
Piaget called them a mini Copernican Revolution; Winnicott referred to them as 
transitional phenomena, Bartlett (1932) referred to this process as “turning around on 
one’s own schema” and more recently the term intersubjectivity and decentration is to 
be found even in theory of mind. Gerard showed throughout his work that this basic 
ontogenetic process at the level of the developing self and the emerging epistemic 
capacities of the child went hand in hand with societal structures. Larger histories are 
always dialectically related to micro, singular stories. His long term thinking on 
human development, social identities and cultural representations helped us to see that, 
contrary to the illusions of much psychology, human beings are “off-centre”, 
depending and relying on others, requiring connection and affiliation to produce 
themselves as social and psychological beings. In Gerard’s account of decentration I 
found inspiration to understand the primacy of intersubjectivity and dialogical 
communication in the making of human life as a distinctive form of life. It is this 
process that accounts for the genesis of the human mind as well as for the genesis of 
societies and cultures.   
Finally as a social psychologist Duveen knew that the social environment can 
be unforgiving. He understood the power of the social, the Durkheimian idea that the 
social is a fact for the psychic subject. As beginners we come into a social world that 
is already structured by social representations and through processes of social 
influence this social world is ready to structure us, to make us into what we are. This 
tension beautifully comes to light in Gerard’s thesis and was a recurrent theme of his 
later work and his interest on how social influence shapes the knowing competences 
and the identity of the developing child (2001a, 2002, 2007). Piaget and Moscovici 
met again in the way Gerard theorised conformity and innovation in human 
development: while conformity to the mainstream collective is a powerful tendency of 
all human societies, transgression and minority influence are the counterpart, a battle 
which reminds us of the potentials embedded in the role of innovators and minorities, 
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of individuals who are able to step back and challenge the chains of culture and what 
they impose on our ways of seeing the world and ourselves. This, Gerard taught me, 
should not be “disregarded as banal individualism because underneath it there is a 
struggle and a desire to see things in a new light, to discover and to illuminate parts of 
the world that get hidden by the blindness produced by the assumptions we take for 
granted and the cultural traditions we inherit” (Jovchelovitch, 2007:44). His writings 
on the development of representations of gender captured this permanent tension 
between tradition and innovation, conformity and rebellion, acceptance and resistance.  
******* 
 
In reading Gerard’s thesis I was able to see again all that always inspired me and 
impressed me in his scholarship as well as many of the issues we discussed and 
reflected upon in our collaborative work during the years. There it is already clear that 
in all of his many dimensions Gerard Duveen was not a typical psychologist. His 
scholarship had a scope and sweep that an age of small specialisations can now only 
dream of recapturing; he thought and wrote about human development and social 
representations drawing on large vistas that came from psychology but also from his 
engagement with the continental social philosophy of the second half of the 20th 
century, in particular Sartre, Goldman and Wittgenstein. Gerard was a refined, 
outstanding thinker; a selective and profound writer - who always chose quality over 
quantity. Music was a great passion and he never completely gave up the idea that 
there is something superior in its language when it came to the hard task of 
understanding our human existence and the tribulations of our psychological lives. 
Very few people will have known Piaget more than he did and in reading his thesis I 
understood better how far and how deep Gerard’s relation to Piaget’s psychology 
went. Out of this deep engagement came the insight that epistemic structures alone 
cannot account for the overall process of cognition: a full account also needs to 
consider the societal and psychic processes that are essential to its formation. But 
perhaps even more importantly than the insights are the lessons he left in the manner 
of his critical engagement. All theoretical traditions contain a certain accumulated 
level of wisdom and knowledge, but as with all human knowledge they are brittle and 
serve us best as platforms that allow us to see further and hopefully jump to a 
different level. They are not dogmas to be defended or rejected but ideas, clusters of 
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evidence, potential spaces from where we draw the conditions of our understanding 
today and perhaps more importantly, the conditions for understanding the limitations 
of our understandings. Think with and against the intellectual traditions you cherish is 
a lesson I learned from Gerard. In the engagement itself we find that very Gerardian 
skill of being able to produce a stance that mixed criticality and generosity, a human 
and professional talent that he showed as a friend, as a teacher and as a scholar.  
All the above comes together in Gerard’s position as a genetic social 
psychologist. When Gerard was made a Reader by the University of Cambridge, he 
decided to be a reader in Genetic Social Psychology, something that gave him an 
almost child-like satisfaction. I had written about this and suggested to him that the 
word ‘genetic’ in Anglo-Saxon psychology has long lost its connection with the 
Piagetian and Vygotskyan vision of understanding the making of psychological 
structures through their genesis and developmental history. In an age ironically 
dominated by fascination with all things biological he might have ended up seen as a 
psychologist of DNA! We laughed. But Gerard insisted in declaring himself a genetic 
social psychologist emphasising again and again the problem of genesis and 
development. Development for him went far beyond the development of the child. 
The development of the child was one particular case of a much larger process of 
structuration and transformation that needed to be apprehended and explained at 
multiple levels. He was never too far away from the Piagetian conception that 
structures are systems of transformation; to see it so you need the right lenses and his 
lenses were the genetic method.   In this sense Gerard was a historian of human 
psychological development, and studied a variety of its empirical instantiations from 
the development of the child, to the development of cultural representations, the 
development of ideas, groups and social influence.  
Soon after Gerard’s death Marie-Claude Gervais and I sat to mourn our 
beloved friend and to write about his legacy. Perhaps out of an unconscious loyalty to 
Gerard we never wrote. But as we used to do while with him, we talked and talked. 
We talked about his being an inspiring and influential teacher who always had time 
for listening and for continuing a conversation, who had taught in the great tradition 
of Socrates’ maieutics, a dialogical exercise between teacher and pupil for generating 
knowledge and understanding. We talked about his being one of the last of the 
flaneurs, always ready to perambulate and to walk around the city, with a book and a 
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newspaper under his arm, order a double espresso and without any hurry light up his 
Gauloise without filter. We talked about his passion for music and for the arts, his 
love of Berg and Caetano Veloso, of Bach and Maria Betânia, of the angels that were 
always with him. 
Gerard had a self-effacing quality that stayed with him to the end of his life. 
And yet he was widely recognised by his friends and colleagues across the world as 
the genuine article. His early departure leaves us with a tremendous sense of loss, not 
only because his untimely death has deprived us of many more important scholarly 
contributions, but also because few people could radiate such warmth and humanity. 
He was a wonderful friend, the best and most generous of colleagues, an inspirational 
voice. It is perhaps not accidental that one of the last papers Gerard wrote explored 
the diversity of relational bonds and communicative genres that bring people together 
(Duveen, 2008). He started this paper just before he received his diagnosis and 
managed to conclude it shortly before his death. It is a brief paper that while clearly 
unfinished retains all the usual qualities of Gerard’s scholarship. There he proposes 
solidarity, sympathy and communion as distinctive relational forms. Gerard had 
always known about human solidarity and sympathy, but it was in illness that he 
experienced communion. How moved and how surprised he was when he realised 
how much he was loved by the friends, family, colleagues, girlfriends and students 
who packed the hospital wards and, who flew from all over Europe to attend the party 
held by his college in the summer of 2008, and who finally came to the chapel of 
Corpus Christi college where his funeral took place in November of the same year. 
His illness and eminent death made him ever so more aware of the relations that 
bound him to others and in his death, as so many times before in his life, Gerard was 
again a teacher to us all.  
 
His lessons and his influence on us will continue.   
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